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Four-dimensional theories of persistence through time
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Four-dimensional theories of persistence through time
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Bogdan Faul 
Edition
Volume 13 Issue 2
Pages
185-199
Abstract
A specification of the conditions on diachronic identity presupposes that objects can per­sist through time. However, this presupposition is controversial. In contemporary litera­ture, there are two kinds of theories of persistence: three-dimensional theories and four-dimensional theories. The goal of this article is to analyze contemporary four-dimen­sional theories of persistence through time and to explicate the general structure of the current discussion of this matter. Firstly, the author compares three-dimensional and four-dimensional theories. Next, he analyzes the way four-dimensional theories solve the para­doxes of coincidence, among which is the fission problem. In the end, the author dis­cusses some contemporary objections to four-dimensionlism.
Keywords
endurantism, perdurantism, exdurantism, stage theory, worm theory, counter­part relation, personal identity, philosophy of time
Date of publication
01.06.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
517
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
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References



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