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Enlightment 2.0. An interview with Tomas Metzinger
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Enlightment 2.0. An interview with Tomas Metzinger
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Thomas Metzinger 
Edition
Volume 13 Issue 2
Pages
144-157
Abstract
Thomas Metzinger's work is at the forefront of interdisciplinary research, where disciplines such as the philosophy of consciousness and cognitive neuroscience intersect. In his essay "Being No One" (Being No One), the encyclopedic scope of the philosophical literature on consciousness is combined with an excellent command of the material on the latest neuroscience research. Here Metzinger innovatively revises the very vocabulary with which the problem of consciousness was previously formulated. Although the advances in cognitive neuroscience of the last twenty years have greatly contributed to the revival of interest in the problems of consciousness among philosophers, many still argued that consciousness cannot be reductionistically explained by cognitive neuroscience. Some insist on the" mystery " of consciousness, which cannot be fully explained, arguing that neuroscience does not have enough resources to deal with the "difficult problem" of the emergence of subjective consciousness in the first person from unconscious neurophysiological processes. In the interview below, Metzinger talks not only about how he interprets these problems, resorting to new conceptual resources that can patch this supposedly insurmountable "gap in explanation" (explanatory gap); but also about how new ideas (for example, the central concept of the "phenomenal Self-model" for his theoretical system) can affect the personal and social experience of being a person.
Date of publication
01.06.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
569
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0.0 (0 votes)
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References



Additional sources and materials

    

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