- PII
- S0236-20070000392-2-1
- DOI
- 10.7868/S70000392-2-1
- Publication type
- Article
- Status
- Published
- Authors
- Volume/ Edition
- Volume / Issue 5
- Pages
- 25-37
- Abstract
- The current body of knowledge on the subjectivity of some non-human vertebrates makes the juristic dichotomy between commodities and persons untenable. While the great apes may (with some limitations) be treated as persons, most vertebrates are non-personal agents that lack the awareness of their own agency, which does not necessarily diminish the intrinsic value of their lives. Unfortunately, the ongoing efforts to raise the status and thus improve the treatment of all sentient animals are hindered by the lack of a realistic conceptual framework for translating the current knowledge of their subjectivity and ensuing individual interests into politics and legislation. Referring to Western philosophers of law (H. Kelsen, A. Ross, N. MacCormick, L. PetraZycki) we therefore propose to grant vertebrates (and possibly some other animals if their subjectivity is recognized by science) legal rights that are appropriate for non-personal subjects even if the scope of such rights has to be very limited in comparison to the rights of human beings.
- Keywords
- AGENCY, SUBJECTIVITY, ANIMAL ETHICS, ANIMAL RIGHTS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
- Date of publication
- 13.11.2025
- Year of publication
- 2025
- Number of purchasers
- 4
- Views
- 1198
RAS PresidiumЧеловек Chelovek
- ISSN (Print) 0236-2007
- ISSN (Online) 2782-2893
Animals as non-human legal entities
Индексирование
Scopus
Crossref
Higher Attestation Commission
At the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Scientific Electronic Library